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Abstract—IPv6, the Internet Protocol suite version 6, uses a Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP). NDP mainly replaces router 
discovery and the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and after that redirects the functions used in IPv4, i.e. the Internet Protocol 
suite version 4. The NDP system is a stateless protocol since it does not need the dynamic host’s configuration protocol server to 
enable the various IPv6 nodes for determining the connected hosts along with the IPv6 network routers. To add layers of protection to 
NDP, the SeND (Secure Neighbor Discovery) extension was developed, which provides router authorization, proof of address 
ownership, and message protection for the protocol. SeND employs CGAs (Cryptographically Generated Addresses) and X.509 
certificates. Despite its many advantages, deploying SeND is not easy, and it is still vulnerable to specific DoS (Denial-of-Service) 
attacks. The components of SeND and its responses to NDP threats are further elaborated in this paper. Also, an overview of the 
implementation of SeND, its limitations, existing vulnerabilities, and current deployment challenges are also presented.  Furthermore, 
to test the performance of SeND under a DoS attack, a test bed was implemented, and the results discussed.   
 




In the age of the Internet today, the existing Internet 
Protocol, IPv4, is faced with issues of scalability and space 
limitation of IP addresses as well as security. To address 
these issues, a new protocol was developed to supersede 
IPv4, called IPv6. The Neighbor Discovery Protocol, NDP, 
provides IPv6 with a Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 
(SLAAC) service and is a core protocol of the IPv6 suite [1]-
[4]. There are many critical functions of NDP including 
identifying physical addresses, detecting duplicate addresses, 
discovering nodes that are found within the same subnet, 
providing active neighbors with reachability information 
about paths, and discovering routers. Additionally, NDP 
enables mobile nodes to join with foreign networks, 
especially important in mobile IPv6, as it eliminates the need 
for foreign agents. Despite its many advantages, since it is 
assumed that every node in a link trusts the other, NDP is 
greatly susceptible to severe attacks. Nevertheless, there are 
instances where this assumption does not hold true, such as 
when wireless networks are utilized [5]. Malicious users can 
forge NDP messages by pretending to be legitimate nodes 
with the intention of attacking the protocol [6]. As a solution, 
a new standard—the RFC 3971, SeND—was developed by 
the IETF (Internet Engineer Task Force) [7]. An X.509 
certification, digital signature, and cryptographically 
generated address (CGA) are the measures that SeND uses 
to protect NDP. SeND was designed such that replay attacks 
and IPv6 address thefts are prevented, message integrity is 
ensured, and the router authority verified. Despite it being a 
potential approach for protecting NDP and making IPv6 a 
safer protocol, SeND is difficult to deploy. This is because 
network device manufacturers and operating system 
developers have not yet implemented SeND to the point that 
it has reached maturity. Besides that, SeND is vulnerable to 
DoS attacks and consumes high bandwidth, besides being 
computationally intensive.  
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
A. Neighbor Discovery Protocol 
ICMP Redirect, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
Router Discovery and ARP are integrated to develop a single 
protocol—IPv6 NDP. The five ICMPv6 control messages—
Router Solicitation, Router Advertisements, Neighbor 
Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, and Redirect—are the 
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basis for most of the core functionalities of NDP [8]. The 
definitions of these messages are as follows:  
1)  Redirect: A message sent from routers to alert hosts of 
better first-hop destinations. 
2) Neighbor Advertisement: A message sent from hosts to 
assist in link-layer address changes or as a Neighbor 
Solicitation reply.  
3) Neighbour Solicitation: Requests sent from IPv6 hosts 
to verify that a node is still reachable or to determine the link 
layer address of a neighbor.  
4) Router Advertisements: Responses or messages, which 
serve as advertisements for the local link prefix and several 
other options, sent from routers to Router Solicitation.  
5) Router Solicitation: Router Advertisement request sent 
from hosts.  
There are two categories of NDP functionalities, which 
involve host-to-host and host-to-router functionalities [9]. 
Host-host functionalities determine direct host reachability, 
IP destination address of the datagram, Duplicate Address 
Detection (DAD), and Neighbor Unreachability Detection 
(NUD) or determination based on the address resolution, if a 
selected address is already present in the link-local network, 
as a basis for determining the next hop. Meanwhile, host-
router functionalities allow the host to differentiate between 
the remote networks and link local network and auto-
configure their IPv6 address based on the router’s provided 
information, in addition to finding routers on the link-local 
network and determining the parameters of the neighboring 
routers and local link network. [10].  
There are 5 categories of NDP messages, i.e., Redirect 
(ICMPv6 number 137); Neighbor Advertisement (NA, 
ICMPv6 number 136); Neighbor Solicitation (NS, ICMPv6, 
number 135); Router Advertisement (RA, ICMPv6, number 
134); and Router Solicitation (RS, ICMPv6, number 133). 
All these categories will become operational after the 
ICMPv6 message structure and format is applied. 
1)  Router Solicitation: The main idea behind the 
application of RS messages is to allow the nodes that were 
present within a specific subset to investigate the presence of 
the IPv6 routers, which are connected to the subnet. A 
multicast message, which is transmitted by the hosts, is 
presented in the link in the form of an immediate response to 
the RA unicast message. 
2)  Router Advertisement: When the IPv6 routers pseudo-
periodically transmit some unsolicited RA messages (if the 
link consists of several other advertising routers), 
synchronization issues that arise are decreased after 
randomizing the interval present between the unsolicited 
advertisements. After receiving an RS message, the routers 
also transmit some solicited Router Advertisement messages. 
The data, which is required by the hosts, is present in these 
RA messages and helps them to understand the link prefixes, 
link MTU, particular routes, a lifetime of the addresses 
generated after auto-configuration, and also determine 
whether or not the address auto-configuration system has to 
be applied. 
3)  Neighbor Solicitation: For verifying a previously 
generated physical address or for discovering the physical 
address of an on-link IPv6 node, the IPv6 nodes transmit the 
NS messages, which generally include the sender’s link-
layer address. If the neighboring node’s reachability needs to 
be verified, the general NS messages are unicast; however, 
for resolving the address-related issues, they are multicast. 
4)  Neighbor Advertisement: As a response to the 
transmitted NS messages, the IPv6 nodes transmit an NA 
message. Different nodes can transmit this unsolicited NA 
message. In this way, the changes that occur in the link-layer 
addresses or in the role that the nodes play are relayed to the 
neighboring nodes. After that, the information needed by the 
nodes, which includes the transmitter’s link-layer address 
and the role played by the sender within the network, is 
stored by the nodes.  
5)  Redirect: The initiating node is notified about the first-
hop address for a particular destination once the IPv6 router 
sends a redirect message. Only the routers can transmit 
redirect messages as unicast traffic. Furthermore, only the 
hosts can process the messages, which are unicast for the 
primary hosts.  
The local network security could potentially be broken 
with the utilization of NDP, which is insecure by default 
[11]. NDP has vast scope, so although it has basic protection 
mechanisms to some extent, it still requires additional 
conditions that must be fulfilled. These include a hop limit 
of 255, a source address that must be a link-local address, 
and NDP messages sent from routers should not go beyond 
the layer in which 2 access networks are directly connected. 
Even if all these conditions were fulfilled, it will still not be 
enough to protect the local networks in IPv6 completely. An 
insecure NDP would be vulnerable to attacks of different 
kinds such as Rogue routing information attacks, spoofing 
attacks, or Replay, DoS, and Redirect attacks [12]. These 
probable attacks are described and categorized in RFC3756. 
To exacerbate the issue, there is even a toolset that was 
developed to attack IPv6, called the Hacker's Choice IPv6 
(THC-lPv6). The many attacks targeted towards NDP are 
further described in the following sections:  
1) Spoofing Attack: This attack involves an attacking node 
that gains unauthorized access by making use of the address 
or identifier of another node [13]. This attack could also give 
rise to different attacks such as DoS and MITM (Man-In-
The-Middle) attacks. In short, if the IPv6 does not have an 
authentication mechanism in place, it will be open to 
malicious node attacks, which use spoofed source addresses 
to generate spoofed IPv6 packets [14]. 
2)  DoS (Denial-of-Service) Attack: When an attacking 
node prevents a legitimate node from communicating with 
another node attached to the link by using up computer 
resources, this is called a Denial-of-Service attack. In this 
attack, the attacker aims to prevent a network node from 
acquiring a network address by generating the DoS on DAD 
(Duplicate Address Detection) [15]. DAD is used to ensure 
that addresses in the same link do not collide. Also, a 
legitimate host might be prevented from obtaining a new 
IPv6 address as a result of a malicious node. The malicious 
node uses a spoofed message stating that it has the address in 
answer to every DAD attempt. Consequently, the victim will 
fail to access the network or configure an IP address because 
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every attempt to generate a new valid IPv6 will not pass the 
address collision check successfully [16]. 
3)  Replay Attack: In this type of attack, the victim is 
given fake replies by malicious nodes that silently capture 
transmitted messages. The attacker changes a captured 
message transmitted between two nodes. For instance, this 
attack could occur when Host B tries to communicate with 
Host A, where, to obtain the physical address of Host B, 
Host A transmits a Neighbour Solicitation message [17]. 
4)  Redirect Attack: This attack prevents the legitimate 
receiver from receiving a packet, by redirecting it to a 
further away node. The attacker could assume the role of the 
legitimate router and take charge of the routing as well as 
generate fake router redirect messages. Because this attack 
intercepts every message exchanged between two nodes, it 
could also act as a MITM attack [18]. 
5)  Rogue Router Attack: This attack involves the 
rerouting of traffic via insertion of rogue information by a 
malicious node. As a result, the victim would not be able to 
access the desired network and the routing tables will be 
infected. In other words, the malicious node acts as a router 
and transmits a fake address prefix. This attack is very 
severe because all joined nodes within the same subnet will 
also be affected [19]. In fact, an expert attacker sometimes 
mixes between the threats mentioned above—such as DoS 
and spoofing—in order to strengthen the attack and make it 
more difficult to detect, in addition to producing packets 
with a fake source address to conceal his identity. 
B. Secure Neighbor Discovery  
As a response to defend against NDP attacks, the IETF 
SeND working group released the first specifications of 
SeND in 2002. SeND is not a new standalone protocol, but 
rather agreed upon enhancements for NDP, which include 
three additional features as an extension to the NDP i.e. a 
mechanism for router authorization, address ownership proof, 
and message protection. TABLE I summarizes the actual 
NDP attacks and corresponding SeND responses to 
overcome these attacks. Fig. 1 outlines the features and 
components of SeND including RSA signature, CGA, 
Timestamp, and Nonce. Also, to secure the process of router 
authorization, SeND added two new ICMPv messages— 
Certificate Path Solicitation and Certificate Path 
Advertisement [20]. 
 
Fig. 1 The Components and Functions of SeND  
SeND is based on CGA, which was created to prevent 
theft of addresses. The main idea behind the application of 
the CGA system is the use of asymmetric cryptography for 
authenticating the IPv6 auto-configuration addresses without 
altering the SLAAC 0-configuration paradigms. IDentifiers 
(IIDs) that can be generated by the 1-way hashing of public 
keys of nodes and other such auxiliary parameters are what 
make up the CGAs, which are also IPv6 addresses. In short, 
the node’s public key is associated with its IPv6 address. 
This can be verified after recalculating the hash values and 
comparing them to the IID values of the transmitter’s 
address. The general CGA system estimates two independent 
1-way hash values (i.e., Hash1 and Hash2). The estimation 
of the Hash2 (112-bit) values establishes an input parameter 
for calculating the Hash1 (64-bit) value. The Hash2 value is 
seen to increase the costs and computing time for hackers 
when they attempt to carry out a brute-force attack. However, 
it does not increase the Hash 2 output value length. The 
Hash 2 value has been described in the IID section of the 
IPv6 node’s address. Also, a scaling factor, i.e., the Security 
Parameter (Sec), assists in maintaining the security for each 
generated address. Sec refers to an unsigned 3-bit integer, 
which has a value ranging between 0 and 7, wherein a value 
of 0 indicates the lowest security while a value of 7 refers to 
the highest security [7]. TABLE II presents the CGA 
parameters, the data structure, and the CGA generating 
notations. 
SP, K_pub, m, and Sec are the input values that the CGA 
generation algorithm uses. The CGA address is output by the 
CGA algorithm. Before obtaining the output, the appropriate 
Sec value must first be used and the public key of the 
address owner established. Then, the Final Modifier is 
assessed and established by the Hash2 computation loop. 
The value of the 16*Sec-leftmost bits of Hash2 must be 0, a 
requirement that the Modifier must be able to satisfy.  
The concatenation of (64 + 8) 0 bits and combination of m 
and K_pub values will result in the Hash2 value. The system 
will terminate the calculation of the Hash2 loop when the 





TABLE I  
RESPONSES OF SEND TO THE NDP THREATS 
 
The Hash1 computation utilizes the saved value of the Final 
Modifier. The process of generating the CGA is outlined in 
Fig. 2. 
TABLE II  







u, g 1-bit each 
IID 64-bit 
K_pub Variable  
K_priv Variable  
Sign Variable  
 
The value of Hash1 represents a hash that is generated out 
of the CGA Parameters Data Structure. Using the Hash1 
value, IID was produced. It then truncates the gained value 
of the Hash to the suitable length (64-bit) and encodes the 
three leftmost bits of IID into a Sec value. From the leftmost 
bits of IID, the 7th and 8th (u and g) bits are set aside and are 
also set to "1" to signify that it represents the CGA address. 
Then, the CGA Parameters Data Structure’s Hash output is 
spread throughout other 59 bits of the IID (2). The 
combination of the (64-bit leftmost bits) for SP with the IID 
part, forms the final complete address of Internet Protocol 
version 6 (3). Lastly, a DAD process is carried out with the 
produced address to check against address collision within 
the same local link. In the event of an address conflict, the 
CC has to be incremented and the Hash1 procedure has to be 
performed again until a valid address is obtained or the CC 
value becomes 2. For validation, the binding between CGA 
and public key CGA Parameter Data Structure is associated 
with the CGA option. To affirm the generated address 
ownership, the owner of the address will make use of a 
private key to sign messages that are transmitted from that 
address. For the purpose of authenticating the identity of the 
sender, SeND utilizes the RSA Signature Option. It can also 




The verification of CGA inputs the CGA Parameter Data 
Structure and IPv6 address. An indicator of a successful 
verification process is that the verifying node will recognize 
that the address fits with the public key. Subsequently, 
messages coming and going from the real address owner can 
be authenticated once the verifier utilizes the public key. Fig. 
3 illustrates this process in more detail. 
By utilizing SeND, the solicitation message will also have 
a Nonce Option. This matching option is required for all 
advertised messages. In this way, a solicitation message that 
a node has previously sent could be certified as a new 
response/replay. In short, this option prevents replay attacks, 
but it only applies for two-way RS/RA communications 
involving NS/NA, and not for one-way communication 
messages. To protect against replay attacks involving 
advertisements that are unwanted such as periodic Router 
Advertisements and Redirect messages, SeND utilizes the 
Timestamp Option. This way, it is assumed that all nodes are 
equipped with synchronized clocks and can, therefore, 
implement a Timestamp checking algorithm to avoid Replay 
attacks. 
For IPv6 address authentication, a combination of the 
CGA and RSA Options are used. The address authentication 
proves that the person owning the specific address is the true 
owner of the subsequent pair of asymmetric keys. SeND 
uses a process known as Authentication Delegation 
Discovery (ADD) in which some third-party services are 
utilized for router authorization and for authorizing and 
validating default gateways for IPv6 routers. ADD can also 
be applied for specifying the IPv6 prefixes that the specific 
router is authorized to relay on the whole link. This process 
can be carried out using 2 new types of ICMPv6 messages, 
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 Fig. 2 CGA Generation Flow 
 
 
Fig. 3 The Pseudo Code used in CGA Verification  
To request certification between a host’s trust anchor and 
router, nodes send a message during the ADD procedure 
called CPS. In response to CPS, another message that also 
contains the router certificate and is ICMPv6 type 149 is 
transmitted. This message is known as CPA. 
Although SeND provides promising security measures for 
protecting NDP messages, its deployment, computation 
requirement, and security in systems are still lacking. This 
could result in increased susceptibility of NDP messages to 
attacks. Therefore, the researcher described the different 
challenges and drawbacks of the SeND process in the 
following section to discuss this issue further.  
Although SeND can prevent the theft of node addresses, 
the real node identity cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore, 
SeND is unable to confirm whether or not the proper node 
had used the CGA address. This case of unverified CGA 
allows hackers to use their public key to generate a novel 
and valid address as well as initiate the necessary 
communication process. In this way, an attacker could use a 
valid public key to mimic a node address; however, since the 
attacker does not have a private key, he will not be able to 
assume the address of the existing host. The SeND system is 
highly vulnerable to DoS attacks. The processes of SeND 
that are most vulnerable are the DAD check, CGA parameter 
verification process, and specific steps of the CGA 
verification process, where the attacker blocks the 
connection from a new CGA node to the link. The attackers 
target the hosts by transmitting many pointless certification 
paths, which force the hosts to use a lot of useless 
verification resources and memory on the paths. Furthermore, 
the CGAs can barely withstand TMTO (Time-Memory 
Trade-Off) attacks [21]. 
The CGA process requires massive computational 
complexity, so it could be possible that after the node has 
developed a suitable CGA process, it could go on applying 
the process at the subnet. This indicates that the main weak 
spot of the nodes, which still apply the CGAs, are attacks 
related to privacy [21]. 
A technique is known as the hash extension, and 
considered as the safety constraint Sec, is used in the CGA 
process. When this factor is applied, the various bits that are 
linearly incorporated into the hash extension technique will 
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be stabilized. This affects the average generation time for a 
CGA address that depends on the Sec-bit setting. In the 
SeND system, every node must include public keys and 
similar significant parameters in its message and also attach 
a signature to each of the generated data packets. This results 
in the consumption of available bandwidth as a result of 
increased communication overhead from the addition of 
more than 1 Kb data to each data packet [7].  
Even to this day, there is a lack of awareness regarding 
the implementation of the SeND technique. The majority of 
computing systems support NDP; however, they are unable 
to support the SeND technique. Although the routers 
developed by major tech giants such as Juniper and Cisco 
provide some support for the SeND technique, most 
operating systems are unable to support the SeND process 
[21]. The researcher has therefore described the current 
application of this technique and presented the limitations of 
every process in this paper. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To launch a DoS attack against SeND, a small test bed 
with four computers, a switch, and a router were used.  The 
computers contain two victim nodes (Windows 10 Home 
and Ubuntu 16.04 respectively) and one attacking node (Kali 
Linux 3.20.2), as per the topology in Fig 4. One computer 
(Windows 8) is used to monitor the network traffic during 
the attack.  THC-IPv6 attacking tools were used to 
implement the DoS attack, and the sendpees6 command was 
used.  
A built-in tool and resource monitor bundled with the 
Windows operating system was used. This allows the users 
to observe the processor utilization, hard disk, network, and 
memory usage. For Linux-based systems, the same tool is 
also available, but under the name system monitor.  
To monitor the CPU usage for Ubuntu 16.04 and 
Windows 10, in the experiment, a system monitor and a 
resource monitor were used, respectively, for 60 seconds. 
The role of each node and its software and hardware 
specifications are outlined in TABLE III. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Test Bed Topology 
To evaluate the impact of a DoS attack, two performance 
metrics, network bandwidth consumption and processor 
utilization, were used. Previous works indicate that although 
SeND has been implemented in both Linux and Windows, 
DoS attacks still occur. Fig. 5 and Fig. 8 show that Windows 
is more vulnerable to DoS attacks compared to Linux. For 
both metrics selected, both Figures 5 and 8 show a 
significant impact on performance. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The use of Internet facilities in Public areas is a matter of 
growing concern, as many users do not trust Public Internet 
services. Due to the problems occurring in the current 
Internet processes, NDPs are susceptible to many network-
based attacks. Furthermore, defense mechanisms such as 
SeND could also give rise to DDoS- or DoS-related attacks. 
SeND is an industry-level process, which can adequately 
secure the NDPs. However, the SeND technique, in itself, is 
susceptible to some DoS attacks. Additionally, higher 
computational costs and a lack of deployment make the 
SeND technique quite unreliable. In this paper, the 
researchers addressed the various SeND functions and 
components. An experiment for establishing the limitations 
of the SeND technique was carried out, and the challenges 
and problems are affecting the implementation of the SeND 
technique addressed. The results show that the DoS attacks 
against the SeND technique could significantly affect IPv6 
network operations. Finally, it is concluded that further 
research must be carried out and more solutions must be 




TABLE III  
COMPUTER ROLES, SOFTWARE, AND HARDWARE SPECIFICATIONS 
 
Node Role Operating 
System 
IP  Address MAC Address Hardware 
Victim  Windows 10 FE80::1 A4:1F:72:5B:73
:A2 
Intel Pentium G645 2.90 GHz 
processor. 
2.00 GB RAM Memory.  
Monitoring Windows 8 FE80::2 74:27:EA:0D:8
9:10 
Intel Core i5 3.00 GHz Processor. 
4.00 GB RAM Memory. 
Victim  Ubuntu 16.04 FE80::3 00:1D:92:01:06
:F4 
Intel Core 2 Duo E4500 2.20 GHz 
processor. 
2.00 GB RAM Memory. 




Intel Pentium Dual T2390 1.86 GHz 
processor. 
2.00 GB RAM Memory. 
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Fig. 5 Windows 10 Home Processor Consumption Before and During DoS Attack on SeND 
 
 
Fig. 6 Ubuntu 16.04 Processor Consumption Before and During DoS Attack on SeND 
 
 
Fig. 7 Windows 10 Home Bandwidth Consumption Before and During DoS Attack on SeND 
 
Fig. 8 Ubuntu 16.04 Bandwidth Consumption Before and During DoS Attack on SeND 
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